Carnival post-phenomenology: mind the hump

By Nicolas Salazar-Sutil (Goldsmiths College, University of London)

The following article is an autoethnographic reading of carnival as an inter-cultural and interpersonal event, and one that does not always profit from anthropological models such as inversion or safety-valve theories. The radical proximity of carnival experience destroys the objectivity of the event and makes it meaningful mainly as a lived-in moment. The following is an account of an individual experience that defines the significance of carnival as a form of kinesis, the shaking up of the static ethnographic “I”; an (un)expected humping. My case-study is the Pyrenean carnival of Bielsa in Spain, and my theoretical ideonauts are Mikhail Bakhtin and Judith Butler. The analysis of their concepts of dialogism and performativity lead to a series of complex anthropological questions regarding the meaning and doing of social and cultural events.

Introduction: a February afternoon in Bielsa

A shroud of mist descends upon Bielsa as the drizzle begins to fall more slowly now, in snowflakes. The surrounding landscape has vanished – the enclosing mountains have faded away leaving us to ourselves. Bielsa is the last stop before highway A-138 disappears in endless tunnels that eventually open up on the other side of the Pyrenees. It is a remote part of Spain. With little over 500 inhabitants, the village is kept afloat by a modest skiing industry in the region, a few nearby national parks, and a constant trickle of French customers who are better off buying their groceries here in Spain. This would be a typically ghostly February afternoon if it were not for the throbbing mass of people packed in the main square. Today, the town is a main attraction for people from all around the country. Don Cornelio, a dummy that will be burnt at the end of the celebrations hangs dully from the frontispiece of the Town Hall – a reminder of the topsy-turvydom to come. The carnival brass band, or charanga, has been warming up with the sound of a pounding football anthem. Thus far, the allegorical figure of Winter (Copos) and Summer (la Hiedra) are the only two traditional characters that have turned up to greet the crowds. It is around five o’clock in the afternoon, and the town is now brimming with people. As we huddle together braving the snow I sense that something out-of-the-ordinary is about to happen…

But I am becoming impatient. I concede my hard-pressed-first-row spot and brave my way through currents of people. In the quiet backroads of the town the parade of the traditional carnival bear (onso) is in full swing, although there are only a number of people watching. My eyes are drawn to one of the two men playing the part of the bear as he lies knocked out on the snowy pavement. I assume the tamer (domador) has missed the large hay padding on the bear’s back and has actually hit the actor on the head. Admittedly, violence is a ritual convention characteristic of these and many other Spanish fiestas. Indeed, violence is an integral part of carnival time, which in the Aragonese sense is religious in ways other than church. Nor is there any need to invoke the quasi-religious health and safety regulations that according to folklorist
Doc Rowe (2006) are increasingly interfering with well-tried ritual techniques in Britain. In fact, the accident gives the performers an opportunity to take an early break, whilst someone produces a bottle of wine to placate the pain and the cold. People laugh as the wine seems to revive the injured bear miraculously. But this is a different type of laughter. It is a wine-induced, life-affirming laughter: a “laughter that destroys distances” (Bakhtin 2004:23).

Performance, reflexivity and autoethnography

In her essay “Teaching for the times”, Gayatri Spivak observes that the literature of ethnicity writes itself between ethnos – a writer writing for her own people [...] without deliberated self-identification as such, and ethnikos, the pejoratively defined Other reversing the charge, (de)anthropologizing herself by separating herself into a staged identity. (Spivak 1992:14-15)

What is implied here is that the critical gaze of the anthropologist aestheticalises the trope of cultural interaction as an exotic and performative otherness. As Spivak observes, the literature of ethnicity in this sense carries, paradoxically, the writer’s signature as divided against itself (1992:15). What Spivak does not question in her essay is whether the anthropologist’s removal and alienation also amounts to a “staged identity” which, through self-detachment, perceives itself as an objective “I”.

In other words, the performative act does not necessarily apply to the ritual actor but to the constructed identity of the observing anthropologist. Judith Butler (2006:197) echoes Spivak when she observes that the language of appropriation, instrumentality and distanciation (my emphasis) germane to the epistemological mode also belongs to a strategy of domination that pits the “I” against the “Other” and, once that separation is effected, creates an artificial set of questions about the knowability and recoverability of that Other. In other words, both the “I” and the “Other” represent forms of normalised behaviour that could be described as performative.

In order to avoid the artificial separation evinced by the anthropologisation of cultural phenomena, I have decided to tackle the usual question of embodied practice by opting for a self-reflexive critical approach; in other words, I will be focusing on my own experience of the Bielsa Valley Carnival. The following article is not a study of carnival phenomenology so much as the autobiographical account of my immersion in the event. What kind of role did I play given the fact that I was not amongst my own people, but amongst others, measuring their otherness in order to articulate a critical reading of it? What are the effects of this separation on my engagement and understanding of the event? At once, my approach begs the question: who is the performer? Is it the tourist, well equipped with digital cameras and mobile phones? Is it the local? Is it the group of men and women in costume? Carnival brings into relief social performance not only in the case of those who are identified as “costumed characters”, but also insofar as the subjectivity of every member of the audience is publicly appresented. Given the contrasting series of relationships enacted throughout the event, the carnival interface highlights the fabricated identity of every person involved, whether it be a tourist, a local, or in my case, a university student in search of academic material.

But what is the point of evaluating my role in this event? What is the point of autoethnography? In short, autoethnography can be understood as a self-reflexive exploration of performed selfhood that employs the self as exemplar in order to
emphasise embodiment, experiential understanding, participatory ways of knowing, sensuous engagement and intimate encounter (Bochner and Ellis 2001). And whilst some scholars have argued that there is a shallow textuality to the confessionalists of autoethnography, there is also a straightforwardness in autoethnographic accounts inasmuch as they provide no definite theoretical answers. So how did I achieve my role of researcher? How was my role normalised in the context of a carnival event? To what extent is my relationship with others a determining factor in the normalisation of this role? Autoethnography does not concern itself with the final meaning of all these questions, but with the ethnographer’s temporary, unstable responses, and the subsequent strategies of meaning production.

In his essay “Discourse in the novel”, written in 1935, Mikhail M. Bakhtin suggests that the activation of meaning is located precisely in the response to the utterance. For Bakhtin, “primacy belongs to the response, as the activating principle: [...] it prepares the ground for active and engaging understanding” (2004:282). By immersing him or herself in this dialogic relationship the anthropologist/ethnographer focuses not so much on the study of the meaning of the utterance, but how that meaning is constructed through given responses. The implication of Bakhtin’s dialogic imperative is that the study of carnival discourse no longer focuses on carnival itself, but on the way various subjects respond to it. Bakhtin levels out the binary relationship between researcher and researched in order to focus on the dialogic, staged identity of the ethnographer qua subject-object, “both dial and instrument” (Foley 2002:476). According to Norman Denzin (2003:234-235), in the confessional reflexivity of autoethnography the writer refuses to make a distinction between self and other, thus privileging multiple subject positions.

For Dwight Conquergood (1992:80), reflexive ethnography exists in a pedagogical borderland, in the spaces where rhetoric, politics, parody, pastiche, performance, ethnography and critical cultural studies come together. The study of carnival offers an ideal case study of Conquergood’s notion of “pedagogical borderland”, precisely because it superimposes some of the fields mentioned above. The borderland nature of reflexive ethnography should not be confused with Turner’s theory of liminality, however, or with the conventional readings of carnival as safety-valve or social inversion models. Borderlines and borderlands in autoethnographic discourse are revealing moments of communication as partial failures, misunderstandings and awkward silences (Carter and Presnell 1994:28). The theoretical meaning of carnival does not congeal into a pre-conceptualised programme. In fact, when posing the question to locals, I have been overwhelmingly greeted with the same silence, and the same answer: we don’t now what carnival means. Or in the words of one of my local informants: “It’s what we have been doing all our lives!” The shift from meaning to doing allows carnival to be a contested borderland, in Conquergood’s sense, where different sets of performative acts are displayed and interrogated. The researcher as performer moves from performance as imitation, or mimesis, to an emphasis on performance as liminality and construction (poiesis), then to a view of performance as struggle, as intervention, as remaking, as socio-political act, in other words, as kinesis (Conquergood 1998:31). Insofar as mimetic theory is largely the search for an intellectual benchmark, an overriding conclusion, intellectualists may want to convince us that when the character of the tranga, which I will turn to below, beats the ground with his ithyphallic pole, he is heralding the awakening of the earth after the winter’s lethargy. In the lived-in moment, however, the act is never conveyed as
an intellectual semiological explication. Instead, meaning is continuously shifting from one participant to another, from one form of carnival kinesis to another.

Now then, although there is some literature on Spanish carnival (Baroja 1965, Gilmore 1998, Harris 2000, 2003), contemporary Pyrenean festivals and the Bielsa Valley Carnival in particular have been neglected by scholars (except Alford 1930, Adell Castán and García Rodríguez 1998). In order to articulate an autoethnographic account of the Bielsa Valley Carnival I have deliberately chosen not to situate this article in the context of a general study of Spanish carnival culture. Instead, I would like to focus on a personal recollection of carnival vis-à-vis two ostensibly unrelated and contrasting theories. On the one hand, I will discuss Butler’s post-phenomenological theory of performativity and the reading of the ethnographer as a staged identity. On the other, I will make recourse to Bakhtin’s dialogic imperative. Subsequently, I will suggest a way of integrating these two theses in order to articulate my response to carnival. Before I proceed, however, it is necessary to offer a few explanatory remarks.

Although Bielsa is located in a highly touristic area of northern Spain, Bielsa itself is an unprepossessing village with a meagre population of 524 inhabitants, hardly a place of interest for the score of hikers, skiers and other tourists who flock into this beautifully mountainous region of Europe. During carnival week, however, the town’s population can double due to the numbers of tourists who attend the event, mostly from nearby cities like Huesca, Zaragoza and Barcelona. A further clarifying point: although I have done fieldwork in Bielsa on three different occasions as part of my MA and PhD projects, I will describe the very first impression I had of the carnival, when my wife and I first visited the town in February 2005.

The dance of the trangas and madamas

So, having left the bleeding bear behind I made my way through a series of meandering roads to a main pedestrian thoroughfare descending onto the town square, where a number of characters had assembled for a carnival procession (pasacalles). A lively parade of Pyrenean stock-characters and others who had turned up as pirates, extraterrestrials or Carmen Mirandas were waiting to descend upon the square. As the streets in Bielsa are extremely narrow and free of motorised transport, I had a chance to get a good look at some of the unique characters of this traditional winter event. The main characters of the Bielsa Valley Carnival are the trangas and madamas. The trangas are local bachelors dressed in skirts, chequered shirts and animal skins. They carry large buckhorns on their heads, their faces are painted pitch black, and their mouths are made to look protuberant with peels of potato skin. They carry large wooden poles (also called trangas), which they thump on the ground and throw without notice or concern into the dense crowds. The madamas, on the other hand, are young women dressed in finely decorated white dresses, and covered in jewellery and multicoloured ribbons. Beauty and the Beast thus walk arm-in-arm through the main street down to the town square.

Tradition has it that the tranga must scour the town in order to fetch the young brides or madamas waiting at their doorsteps. The madama is thus “betrothed” to the first tranga that happens to fetch her at her door, becoming a possession of the tranga for the duration of the carnival. Once the procession has made its way to the main square the couple waltzes to the tune of the brass band in a dance known as la ronda. As
soon as the dance is over the *trangas* abandon their brides in order to chase and mock rape other young women in the crowd. The large cowbells wrapped around their waists create a cacophony of noise as the humping and shaking of buttocks sweeps the town with an uncontrollable carnival sensation. This act of sexual bedlam is, in a nutshell, the schedule of the Bielsa Valley Carnival: year in, year out.

**A view from the balcony**

My wife and I had been warned that the zoomorphic bachelors of Bielsa were likely to make vulnerable naysayers a target of their sexual assaults, so in order to avoid an unpleasant encounter we walked up to a balcony overlooking the town square where we had a better view. Minutes later, one of the *trangas* noticed that we had safely ensconced ourselves in the balcony in order to photograph the event. The Beast ran at us and I confronted it by wife’s desperate request. But my tussle with the *tranga* did not last long. As the actor charged head-on the oncoming buckhorns forced me to squeeze myself against the wall. The *tranga* quickly made its way up to the top of the balcony, whereupon it proceeded to “fertilise” my wife and tease a group of local children that were amusing themselves at our expense. When the same *tranga* saw us in a bar later that evening it burst into a libidinous mood yet again. This time it was not my wife but myself that was on the receiving end, as the *tranga* decided to gulp down my glass of beer. No point arguing: all ritual performers are licensed to drink and hump freely during carnival day.

Exposed as we were to everyone else in the square, our safe outpost became a de facto public stage for all to feast their curious eyes on. It could be argued that my role was to position myself in a safe location, but only so that I could allow myself to be jeered at for attempting to play such a passive role. In other words, my task as university student and ethnographer was not valid as far as the *tranga* was concerned. For this very reason, it could be argued that I played a significant role, and for a simple reason too: my notion of the objective “I” was debunked by the sexual brutality of carnival. The static onlooker is a necessary character in carnival insofar as it juxtaposes itself against the sexual kinesis of the *tranga*. The balcony is not the ideal bird’s-eye view of the controlling ethnographer, but yet another space for public humiliation and debasement.

One heavy dosage of free wine later, the roles played by the various participants (tourists, locals, film-crews, and ethnographers), seemed to blur, as many began to understand the meaning of carnival possibly as the absence of hierarchical differences. In Bakhtin’s words: “as a distanced image, a subject cannot be comical; to be comical it must be brought close” (2004:23). Carnival thus works in a zone of maximal proximity where objects are drawn into a space of crude contact. It is this extreme carnival interface (physical, phatic, olfactory and auditive) that levels out the various roles played by the participants and shakes up the static “I” into a kinetic “us”. The kind of performance staged in Bielsa intensifies sound, touch, smell and movement in order to blur the identity distinctions created by social conditioning. My function as visitor/tourist/critic is precisely to establish the identity distance that can be broken down by the brutal humour of carnival.
Bakhtin to Butler: towards a post-phenomenology of carnival performance

So far I have argued that there is a problem in trying to explicate carnival theoretically. The problem hinges on my assumption that the lived-in moment cannot be totalised, it cannot be shared by everyone as equal value. The meaning of lived-in moments thus implies that carnival experience must be given supplementary significations. To mean is thus not to signify, but to enter into a dialogic performative relationship with other meanings. In Bakhtin’s eyes, there is a dialogic imperative that must be taken into account when analysing literature, linguistics, or even philosophy. According to Bakhtin:

The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance; it cannot fail to become an active participant in social dialogue. (2004:276)

Unlike Butler, who identifies a point of resistance in her theory of performativity, Bakhtin argues for a relational network of dialogues that constitute meaning that does not justify a dominating force. For Bakhtin, official literature and popular literature are not to be understood in a relation of domination, but dialogue. This is not to say that Bakhtin refuses to theorise the notion of authority. In Rabelais and his world (1984), Bakhtin often describes carnival as the debasement of an intellectualist authority, a shift from a capital authority (in other words the authority of the head), to the lower body or material bodily grotesque. The relationship between these different body parts is not monologic, or heteronomic, as Butler would have it. Thus, according to Bakhtin, “the word in language is half someone else’s” (2004:293). Meaning is located in the interplay between two binaries but never in a coercive space that imprints its signification as a totalised force. The direction of meaning does not move uni-directionally from signifier to signified, from head to body. Instead, it is a retroactive and dialogic relationship between the two.

Phenomenology often claims to celebrate this ambiguity and subjectivity in theory. The problem with phenomenology, as I see it, is how to tease out the essence of selfhood without falling into essentialisms that defeat the intention of the exercise. Performance phenomenologist Bert O. States attempts to bypass this question by claiming that phenomenology is an attitude rather than a relentless methodology or a deep philosophical concern (States 1992:369-381). There is an attempt here to overcome the distance of a staged persona, albeit it does not fill the gap in the same way that the tranga’s material bodily humping does. No matter how mediated, provisional or reviseable, phenomenology posits the contradictory possibility that “lived bodiliness”, to use Merleau-Ponty’s term (quoted in Garner 1994:28), may provide answers to essentially overarching philosophical questions. Breaking away from the rigid phenomenology of Hegel and Husserl, Judith Butler employs the term to question the possibility that the “essence of things” may not be finaliseable at all. In other words, she proposes a post-phenomenological view of performativity whereby the subject is in fact illegible. In Butler’s words: “that power continues to act in illegible ways is one source of its relative invulnerability” (1996:134).

Spivak’s description of the ethnologist as a “staged self” provides the ideal springboard for a discussion of Butler’s notion of performativity, and its application to some of the questions raised above. According to Butler, there is no ontological status
to the staged self, no pre-existing or pre-discursive subject that owns the performative act. In *Gender Trouble* Butler (2006:34) conveniently quotes Nietzsche’s insight that “there is no being behind doing […] – the doing itself is everything”. For Butler, meaning is performative in the sense that the essence or identity that the performative utterance otherwise purports to express are fabrications manufactured through discursive means. Thus every subject is coordinated by a normalising force that dictates the notion of individual selfhood and self-identification. The question of agency, according to Butler, is not to be answered through recourse to an “I” that pre-exists signification. Instead:

> the enabling conditions for the assertion of “I” are provided by the structure of signification, the rules that regulate the legitimate and illegitimate invocation of that pronoun, the practices that establish the terms of intelligibility by which that pronoun can circulate. (Butler 2006:196)

In her essay “Performative acts and gender constitution: An essay in phenomenology and feminist theory”, Butler (1988:521) suggests that a phenomenological theory of constitution requires an expansion of the conventional view of acts to mean both that which constitutes meaning and that through which meaning is performed. Transferring phenomenological theory from meaning to performance not only implies a paradigm shift from theory to empiricism, as Victor Turner proposed in his “anthropology of experience” (1986). By shifting towards a phenomenology of performance, the lived-in moment ceases to be perfectly intelligible. It ceases to be *poiesis* in order to become *kinesis*. In other words, meaning becomes an instance of mobility, which in the present case study is the brutal humping of the *tranga*.

In order to make sense of Butler’s use of the term “performativity”, it must be pointed out that performativity is not a question of expression. Unlike Turner, Butler eschews the notion that experience crystallises as it is expressed, not least because Butler’s performativity is not about an expressive and finalised subject. Performativity here does not refer to a pre-existing self who expresses meaning through various acts, postures and gestures. Instead, performativity relates to the iteration of compulsory identity norms in order to stabilise the fictive subject as an abiding social entity. Performativity is not an act one puts on at will: it is a social imposition that precludes optionality (Butler 1988:521-522). Furthermore, the interiority or essence so keenly sought by the phenomenologist becomes, according to Butler (2006:185), an effect and function of a decidedly public and social discourse, the public regulation of fantasy through the surface politics of the body.

According to Butler, the subversion of this performative self is more than a merely parodic or carnivalesque act. Unfortunately, it is not clear how the social and cultural imposition of performativity can be subverted or “troubled”. The rigidity of Butler’s theory seems to founder on her emphasis on performativity as an act of social control, or an imposition of heteronomic rules. I would not dispute Butler’s proposition that our sense of subjectivity is largely a construction legitimised by a given social authority. However, I do not agree with Butler’s claim that the performative act is irreducible, or that it is a “mimesis without end” (1996:151). Although Butler would probably argue that the Bielsa carnival is a performative ritual whereby gender identities are publicly normalised, with the males playing the dominating force and the women submitting to their zoomorphic partner, the Bielsa carnival is no longer played out entirely in the context of a ritual festivity. Insofar as the Bielsa carnival ritual is no longer exactly what it was, and now incorporates various layers of inter-
cultural and interpersonal entertainment, performative acts collide and question each other. Performativity thus becomes a site of multiple contestations rather than a social regulation that reaffirms male domination. The repetitive norms of ritual are lifted, which makes the event a flexibly ritualistic public party during which subjectivities can be intervened and experimented upon.

For Butler, however, the parody displayed in carnival is not necessarily a political statement. In other words, carnival is not an intervention of the performative repetition of personhood. According to Butler, the parodic repetition of gender also exposes the illusion of gender identity as an intractable depth and inner substance. Insofar as socially normalised identities are acts that are open to self-criticism and self-parody, the hyperbolic exhibitions of carnival are, in their very exaggeration, a revelation of the phantasmic status of the gendered and normalised self. But here Butler is open to further interrogation.

Carnival can be political insofar as it closes up on the socialised and normalised subject in order to index its constructed and artificial nature. This exposition of the subject in the eyes of others, like the incident on the balcony described above, can be understood as a moment when different types of performed identities collide and are called into question. Everybody can see, as I stand in the balcony facing the laughing crowds, that my academic self is a questionable if not ridiculous performance in the context of carnival. The debasement of fabricated selfhoods brings everyone into contact as equals, which is why by the end of the night various groups of strangers find themselves dancing together in the town square or in the local gym, where an after-party is organised by local youth groups. The political effects of carnival are clearly illustrated in Bielsa insofar as regional differences and identity fractures are levelled, if only momentarily, to create a carnival ochlocracy. And whilst materialist theorists have argued that “time off” and carnival inversion function as the recovery of the labour force for the further reproduction of capital, the exchange that is lived out in carnival can blur differences in a way that is not necessarily conducive to a Monday morning, back-to-work mode.

Conclusion

Have I succeeded in integrating Bakhtin’s dialogic imperative with Butler’s theory of performativity? I cannot say. The difficulty with this theoretical exercise seems compounded by the fact that Butler awards no space for dialogue or agency to the subject. For Butler, agency is an almost accidental event in the repetition of legitimated performativity; a failure to reproduce faithfully. There is a good reason to discuss carnival in relation to these disparate theories, however. What I have argued in this paper is that performativity does not necessarily operate as the naturalised control mechanism of a social authority. There is a dialogue between different performative selves that allows us to understand our own performative act as something alien, in other words, not as a phantasmic illusion but as a concrete and modifiable fabrication. By holding our performative selves in view of one another we act as mirrors of our constructed and illusionary self-identifications, to the point that we can intervene in our strategies of self-identification, and opt for different strategies for self-legitimation.

What carnival evokes in my case is the exposure of the fabricated nature of my identity qua academic. Carnival highlights the inconsistencies of a legitimated
academic persona in the eyes of those who have no care in the world for the tight protocols of academia. By attempting to see myself through the eyes of the “Other” I also see the force behind my performed social subjectivity. There is a clash between contrasting sets of performative selves that not only creates the necessary rupture in the repetition of the performative self itself. The realisation of what I look like in the eyes of others also allows me to alter and intervene in a subject formation. It inserts me into a dialogue between overlapping sets of subjectivities, where no ruling authority can determine the directionality of meaning.

Bakhtin (2004) suggests that the subject is a point where centralisation and decentralisation, unification and disunification, intersect in the utterance, so that the utterance not only speaks the language of its own performativity as an individualised embodiment of a speech act, but also answers the requirements of heteroglossia. In other words, what Butler calls performativity functions as a mimetic reproduction of centripetal as well as centrifugal stratifying forces, to use Bakhtin’s terminology. Put simply, the authorities that legitimate performative acts do not function in isolation, as Butler seems to suggest, but in a dialogic relationship, where different performative acts are called into question by mirroring each other’s fabricated selves. In sum, performativities are pitted against each other in order to delegitimise themselves. The carnival interplay between two or more sets of performative acts questions the validity of separation, and the need for epistemological differentiations. As I have already mentioned, there can be no final realisation, no all-pervasive meaning of the carnival. Instead, there is an economy of presences and absences that demand ever-changing interpretations. This exchange between different categories of normalised behaviour alerts us to our contrasting differences. In the process, I am capable of seeing myself as otherness. This approximation refashions the lived-in moment as a new topos; an absence domiciled by endless possibilities and futures.

Finally, when the public body comes to life in this inter-cultural interaction, the sense of inter-community is confirmed in all its complexities – like the tacit understanding between two strangers dancing. The entire community is in fact a large synchronicity of strange bodies dancing to the rhythm of the clanging bells in the trangas’ waists and the music of the charanga. Once the mass of people has danced, performed, fertilised itself or counter-mirrored its inconsistencies, the movement of the crowd can gradually slow down. The music of the brass bands fade and people allow themselves to be taken in by a quiet, pregnant night or the warm comfort of drunkenness. Only then is normality allowed to return to the wintry streets of Bielsa.

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**About the author**

Nicolas Salazar Sutil is currently finishing his PhD at the Centre for Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths College, London. He trained as an actor at Drama Centre London and completed an MA-Res in Theatre and Drama at Royal Holloway, which dealt with the subject of performativity and carnival in the Pyrenees. His present research deals with performativity in numerical discourse and the effects of numerical measurement on
cultural practices and identity, particularly in relation to corporate football and politics. He lives in London with his wife and child. He can be contacted at either cup03ns@gold.ac.uk or nicolas_salazar@hotmail.com